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Understanding EU Solidarity and Migration in Crisis: Narratives of Health as Tools of 
Governance 
 
Abstract 
 
The so-called European migration crisis has sparked significant attention from scholars and 
raises questions about the role of solidarity between states and the European Union (EU) in 
providing policy solutions. Tension exists between upholding the rights of those seeking entry 
and pooling resources between Member States to provide a fair and efficient migration system. 
This article deconstructs the shifts that have occurred in EU migration policy since 2015 to 
highlight how narratives of health have become as tools of governance. It does so to illuminate 
how health narratives operate to minimise the impact conflicts on the nature and substance of 
EU solidarity have on policy development in response to the perceived crisis. A 
governmentality lens is used to analyse the implications of increasingly prescribed policy 
applications based on screening and categorising, and how measures operate to responsibilise 
migrants and third-countries to act according to EU values. It is argued this approach to 
governance results in migrants facing legal uncertainty in terms of accessing their rights and 
excludes them from the EU political space, which is problematic for how EU governance can 
be understood.  
 
I. Introduction 
 
On 19th April 2015, an estimated 800 migrants lost their lives after the vessel they were 
travelling in capsized making the journey across the Mediterranean Sea from North Africa to 
the coasts of Italy and Greece. The event marked a turning point for migration policy in Europe 
which had been kindling since the “incendiary” Lampedusa disaster in 2013.1 Tragedies like 
these signify how in recent times the issue of migration, particularly how it should be governed 
and who by, has become politically loaded and often at the crux of debates on national 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, Brexit, and the allocation of both economic and physical 
resources by governments. Health as a political issue is also highly charged, most commonly 
this is considered in relation to the role of the state to provide for the health of its citizens. This 
article aims to deconstruct European Union (EU) migration policy following the crisis in 2015 
in order to understand how health is used as governance tool to overcome problems with 
solidarity between Member States.2 Ideas traditionally associated with health policy are used 
to frame the governance pursued in relation to migration and better understand the way 
migration policy operates between the polity and the individual subject. This article 
investigates how the EU’s response to increased migration serves to preserve the EU project 
as a whole and argues that using tools of health policy to frame the governance of the migration 
crisis obscures the value conflicts that migration issues raise for the EU in relation to its 
constitutional system and a lack of solidarity. 
 
How migration law and policy form part of the broader EU ‘project of government’ is examined 
and attention drawn to the tools used by the EU to resolve the migration crisis, particularly how 
these prioritise the EU system above the rights and obligations vis-à-vis migrants arriving into 
the EU. The contribution of van Kolfschooten to this special issue also alludes to instances 
                                                     
* Research Fellow, University of Birmingham, contact: r.m.dickson@bham.ac.uk. 
1 S Stillman ‘Lampedusa’s migrant tragedy, and ours’ (The New Yorker, 10 October 2013) < 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/lampedusas-migrant-tragedy-and-ours> accessed 15 August 
2019. 
2 European Commission, ‘A European Agenda on Migration’ (Communication) COM(2015) 240 final.  
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where EU governance is prioritised over individual rights. Research that opens up how we 
understand the nature and effects of EU governance, and the connotations of health this 
contains, is necessary for a number of reasons. First, examining policy and actions taken from 
a health perspective provides a different understanding of what a crisis is. The term arguably 
sums up the modern human experience and is used to describe circumstances ranging from 
global financial markets, to the rule of law, to local authority care provisions, and the effects 
of climate change. Common across the multiplicity of crisis is an assumption that the traditional 
methods of governance, regulation or systemic processes have broken down or are no longer 
fit for purpose. Crisis indicates a need to change tactics and realign in order to return to stability. 
The theoretical framing of both crisis and health is outlined in Section II. 
 
Further, through the development of new frames of analysis it is possible to characterise the 
tools of governance utilised at the EU-level by analysing synergies between different areas of 
law and policy. As result, discussion of these issues can progress beyond the consideration of 
sheer numbers or the perceived impotence of certain actors, to reveal deeper issues with how 
the EU as an entity can mobilise. Thus, the literature of crisis develops beyond the dichotomy 
of survive or perish,3 a get out clause so existing law no longer applies, 4 and a tool to make 
work relevant.5 
 
The article is proceeds by establishing a theoretical frame for the research, first by 
conceptualising the understandings of crisis and health that underpin the deconstruction of EU 
migration policy since 2015. Subsequently, the benchmarks for analysis that will be applied 
are outlined. The article then considers how these tools are used to advance a governmentality 
that operates on ideas of health in order to resolve the crisis and facilitate a return to stability 
in the EU. Two case studies are used that demonstrate how this governmentality operates in 
practice; the screening and categorisation of migrants at the EU border, and tools for self-
management that are fostered through responsibilisation. The central argument advanced is 
that a lack of solidarity between EU Member States in terms of cooperation and integration in 
migration policy results in governance tactics that prioritise the preservation of the EU project 
over migrant rights. This governmentality operates to dehumanise the migration experience 
and relies on indicators, screening, and prescribed outcomes that treat people akin to the way 
medicine treats a disease. By drawing attention to these trends, the EU narrative of a holistic 
and comprehensive migration policy is challenged and attention drawn to the exclusionary and 
marginalising elements of the approach.  
 
II. Theoretical frame 
 
Crisis has become a common signifier of the EU in recent years and is used in relation to the 
overall project and actions in specific policy areas such as the constitutional crisis,6 the 
                                                     
3 R Koselleck (M W Richter (tr) ‘Crisis’ (2006) 67 The Journal of the History of Ideas, 357. 
4 R Youngs, ‘Fusing security and development: just another Euro-platitude?’ (2008) 30 Journal of European 
Integration 419. 
5 H Charlesworth, ‘International law: a discipline of crisis’ (2002) 65 The Modern Law Review 377. 
6 C Church & D Phinnemore, ‘From the Constitutional Treaty to the Treaty of Lisbon and beyond’ in M Cini & 
N Perez-Solorzano Borragan (eds) European Union Politics (5th edn, Oxford University Press, 2016). 
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Eurozone crisis,7 the disintegration crisis,8 and in relation to migration.9 Indeed, Brito Bastos 
and de Ruijter’s article in this issue speaks to the constitutional aspects of responding to 
emergencies and crises in the EU.  The aim here is to characterise more specifically how a 
crisis affects the EU’s ability to operate its governance and examine the actions taken to 
overcome the challenges faced in resolving the crisis. In particular, mobilising Member States 
to act in solidarity and share responsibility for migration has been challenging with border 
states such as Greece and Italy expressing frustration at the assistance provided by fellow 
Member States.10 According to Roitman, using the analogy of an illness illustrates the dual 
nature of crisis. First, crisis can relate to the observable condition: the associated chaos, 
uncontrollable symptoms, the imminent threat to life that occurs when a person takes ill 
suddenly.11 Second, crisis relates to the course an illness will take. Using this definition, crisis 
is the moment when either cure or death is determined. In other words it is the moment of 
decision that determines the future.  
 
When applying this perspective to crises of policy or law, it becomes imperative to understand 
the governance that is mobilised to ‘prevent death’ and resolve the crisis; the cure if you will. 
The actions, policies and decisions that are taken to de-escalate the situation, and return to state 
of stability, a state of health, in the polity. By examining the nature of crisis governance, the 
power relations it contains and the position it creates for the individual subject, it is possible to 
reveal knowledge about the ‘health’ of the EU system of governance more broadly and expand 
understanding of how it operates in relation to its central values and individual targets of 
governance when under pressure.  
 
To further conceptualise the health being examined. This article is not about migrants’ right to 
health, or the EU’s health policy towards migrants, but rather is about how ideas of health 
underpin the type of governance preferred in the response to the migration crisis. Therefore, 
the health being discussed is the state in which the EU project is in and a concern to treat the 
migration crisis in a way that protects the EU’s integration goals. The rights, obligations and 
duties discussed are therefore broader than health and include access to justice, right to a fair 
hearing, right to an appeal, the broad spectrum of human rights of which tangible health is of 
course one.  
 
The article, then, makes a contribution about health narratives as tools of governance in two 
aspects. The first is in relation to the practical tools of governance used by the EU in response 
to the crisis and how they operate towards migrants seeking entry to the EU. This contribution 
is empirical and involves analysis of the policy changes and developments that have occurred 
since the advent of the migration crisis. The second contribution is to the theory that helps 
makes sense of governance and the tools of analysis that help us to understand it better. Central 
                                                     
7 R Vilpišauskas, ‘The Euro zone crisis and differentiation in the European Union: a threat to the goals of the 
EU or an instrument of managing the divergence of national interests? (2014) 12 Lithuanian Annual Strategic 
Review 75; F Schimmelfennig, ‘European integration in the Euro Crisis: the limits of postfunctionalism’ (2014) 
36 Journal of European Integration 321. 
8 B Rosamond, ‘Brexit and the Problem of European Disintegration’ (2016) 12 Journal of Contemporary 
European Research 864. 
9 L Buonanno, ‘The European Migration Crisis’ in D Dinan, N Nugent & W E Paterson (eds) The European 
Union in Crisis (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017) p. 100. 
10 M Renzi, ‘The Mediterranean migrant emergency is not Italy’s. It is Europe’s’ (The Guardian, 23 June 2015) 
< https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/23/mediterranean-migrant-crisis-not-italy-but-europe> 
accessed 20 August 2019. 
11 J Roitman, ‘Crisis’ (2012) Political concepts: a critical lexicon 
<http://www.politicalconcepts.org/issue1/crisis/> accessed 10 June 2019. 
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to this approach are the ideas of governmentality, as both a lens for analysis and a variety of 
power relations characterising specific types of governance; how ‘governing occurs and how 
it is thought’.12 Specifically, how the EU’s approach to resolving the crisis constitutes 
governmentality by seeking to alter how migrants and third-countries conduct themselves in 
relation to the EU. A rich scholarship on governmentality has developed since Foucault’s 
lectures in 1977-78. Recently the reflexive and continually evolving nature of governmentality 
has been stressed in the literature, as William Walters advocates: 
 
If we take the view that governmentality is a ready-made framework that merely needs 
to be applied to migration research, we leave little room for the encounter. For 
governmentality to encounter migration there needs to be change on both sides: what 
we understand by governmentality should itself be modified and enhanced by the 
meeting with migration problems.13 
 
Thus, the article contributes to existing knowledge and understanding of EU governmentality 
and how both its practice and perceptions are altered by its encounter with the migration crisis 
from 2015 onwards.  
 
The article then differs from the trends identified in the existing literature on migration and 
health governance. This literature can be classified into five broad themes. First, studies on 
how to provide adequate healthcare to migrants. This research generally hails from healthcare 
practitioners and medical journals and discusses the approaches of professionals and healthcare 
services to increased migration.14 Second, and related, is a body of literature on migrant access 
to healthcare and services in host states. Many of these studies involve comparative case studies 
analysing variances across national policies.15 Others examine specific challenges faced by 
certain migrant groups when accessing healthcare services, for instance undocumented 
migrants16 and asylum seekers.17 A third literature clusters around questions of how healthcare 
systems can resource the challenges brought by increased migration.18 Fourth, some scholars 
have recognised that migrants face health inequalities as a result of their migration and seek to 
examine the impact and nature of these.19 
                                                     
12 B Sokhi-Bulley, Governing (through) Rights (Hart, 2016). 
13 W Walters, ‘Reflections on migration and governmentality’ (2015) 1 Movements 1. 
14 P Mladovsky, ‘Migrant health in the EU’ (2007) 13 Eurohealth 9; C Maffia, ‘Health in the age of migration: 
Migration and health in the EU’ (2008) 81 Community Practitioner 32. 
15 N Nørredam et al., ‘Access to health care for asylum seekers in the European Union – A comparative study of 
country policies’ (2005) Journal of Public Health; N Nørredam & A Krasnik, ‘Migrants’ access to health 
services’ in Rechel et al. (eds) Migration and Health in the Europan Union (2011, OUP: Oxford) ; C Björngren 
Cuadra, ‘Right of access to health care for undocumented migrants in EU: a comparative study of national 
policies’ (2012) 22  European Journal of Public Health 267; A Woodward et al., ‘Health and access to care for 
undocumented migrants living in the European Union: A scoping review’ (2014) 29 Health Policy Planning 
818.  
16 C Björngren Cuadra, ‘Right of access to health care for undocumented migrants in EU: a comparative study 
of national policies’ (2012) 22  European Journal of Public Health 267; A Woodward et al., ‘Health and access 
to care for undocumented migrants living in the European Union: A scoping review’ (2014) 29 Health Policy 
Planning 818. 
17 M Nørredam et al., ‘Exploring disease trajectories according to migrant status – does the ‘healthy migrant 
effect’ last?’ (2013) 23 The European Journal of Public Health 234. 
18 C Zimmerman et al., ‘Migration and health: A framework for 21st Century Policy-making’ (2011) 8 PLoS 
Medicine; B Rechel et al., ‘Migration and health in an increasingly diverse Europe’ (2013) 381 The Lancet 
1235; S Kleinert & R Horton, ‘Health in Europe – successes, failures and new challenges’ (2013) 381 The 
Lancet 1073; W Riccardi, ‘Health in Europe – Policies for Progress’ (2013) 381 The Lancet 1075. 
19 A Davies, A Basten & C Frattini, ‘Migration: A Social Determinant of the Health of Migrants’ IOM 
Background Paper (2006) 
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This fifth literature connects with another area of scholarship that examines the governance 
trends that operate in relation to migration and health. Pertinent to this article, is how scholars 
have made connections between migration and/or health and other policy areas or policy trends. 
For example, MacPherson et al. examine the influence of migration and mobility on the 
relationship between health policy and foreign policy.20 Hollings et al. examine how health and 
migration encounter one another during border crossing procedures21 and McMichael et al. 
query the relationship between migration, health and climate change.22 From this literature, a 
fluidity in the governance styles across these policy areas can be detected which, along with 
other migration studies, 23 argue that tools of governance are co-opted across diverse policy 
areas when it is deemed useful and expedient to do so. 
 
1. Governmentality of a crisis 
 
Under examination here is the encounter between migration, crisis, and health in the EU. 
Specifically, the analysis focuses on the governance of the crisis and the action taken to bring 
it under control and avoid a recurrence. Alexander Betts proposed the idea of “survival 
migration” as a result of failed governance contributing to a crisis of displacement, indicating 
governance affects migration trends and feeds into potential future crises.24 Indeed across legal 
and political scholarship, health concepts have been used to examine and understand 
governance trends. For example, Inda compared US border policy to prophylaxis25 and Derrida 
understood crises in the political system as autoimmunity.26 Here, tools of governance are 
identified that operate to facilitate a particular construction of health within in EU, specifically 
that the core value of solidarity between states can be mobilised when the EU faces a crisis. 
Thus the article addresses questions such as, how the governance techniques adopted in 
response to the migration crisis are based on ideas of health? Who do these ideas of health 
relate to? What understanding do these encounters of health and migration produce for both 
the act of governing, in other words how we understand EU governance, and the individual to 
be governed, in other words how we understand the migrant as a legal subject in the EU?  
 
The approach takes as its object the practical tools of governance that maintain the discourse 
that EU solidarity can respond positively to crisis and the ideas, actions and techniques that 
                                                     
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.462.6286&rep=rep1&type=pdf; D Malmusi, C 
Borrell & J Benach, ‘Migration-related health inequalities: showing the complex interactions between gender, 
social class and place of origin’ (2010) 71 Social Science and Medicine 1610; D Ingleby, ‘Ethnicity, migration 
and the ‘social determinants of health’ agenda’ (2012) 21 Psychosocial Intervention 331. 
20 DW MacPherson, BD Gushulak & L Macdonald, ‘Health and foreign policy: influences of migration and 
population mobility’ https://www.scielosp.org/scielo.php?pid=S0042-
96862007000300013&script=sci_arttext&tlng=pt. 
21 J Hollings, M Samuilova & R Petrova-Benedict, ‘Health, migration and border management: analysis and 
capacity-building at Europe’s borders’ (2012) 57 International Journal of Public Health 363. 
22 C McMichael, J Barnett & A J McMichael, ‘An ill wind? Climate Change, Migration and Health’ (2012) 
https://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/doi/abs/10.1289/ehp.1104375. 
23 P J Cardwell, ‘Tackling Europe’s Migration ‘Crisis’ through Law and ‘New Governance’ (2018) 9 Global 
Policy;  R Dickson, Migration in Crisis: Implications for European Union law, policy and human rights 
(Routledge, forthcoming). 
24 A Betts, Survival migration: Failed governance and the crisis of displacement (2013, Cornell University 
Press: New York). 
25 J X Inda, ‘Border prophylaxis: technology, illegality, and the government of immigration’ (2006) 18 Cultural 
Dynamics 115. 
26 J Derrida, ‘Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides – A Dialogue with Jacques Derrida’ in G Borradori 
(ed.) Philosophy in a Time of Terror (2003, University of Chicago Press: Chicago). 
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make this rationality of governance a reality. To do this, I analyse the changes made to 
migration policy after the crisis period in April 2015 until the end of the Juncker Commission 
in 2019. Governmentality emerged from the work of Michel Foucault and has been used by 
scholars to investigate and analyse a range of problems and circumstances. It offers an effective 
way of framing analysis as by envisaging the migrant crisis as a ‘problem of government’ for 
the EU and wishing to examine the response, the research methods must allow for a broad 
understanding of what constitutes government, where this government operates and who it 
operates for.27 Govermentality involves a specific understanding of power and a way to better 
understand how people and objects are governed.28 Government can be interpreted both 
narrowly and widely and extends beyond formal measures.29 From this perspective government 
is “an activity that undertakes to conduct individuals throughout their lives by placing them 
under the authority of a guide responsible for what they do and what happens to them”.30 Thus, 
governmentality denotes the “techniques and procedures for directing human behaviour”, 
ranging from children at school, to organised religion, the household and even oneself.31 Rather 
than explicit domination or authority, governmentality is concerned with the “conduct of 
conduct” in subtle ways whereby the individual to be conducted becomes complicit in the 
governing.32 
 
Work by others in this area forms a loose typography; the governmentality of unease,33 the 
governmentality of risk,34 and, as utilised here, domopolitics.35 Different rationalities underpin 
these governmentalities. For example, the concern to manage the risk that comes from not 
screening blood that could be contaminated with HIV or the mitigating the unease that occurs 
when those who are sexually deviant are reintroduced into communities. Walters notes that 
part of governmentalities attractiveness as an approach to governing is its development during 
“a period of great change and instability in political, economic and social life” as in these times 
the impetus to return to stability overrides other concerns.36 If the migrant crisis is 
conceptualised as a ‘problem of government’ then the response involves the EU attempting to 
“conduct the conduct” of the migrant subject through a complex governmentality.37  
 
Domopolitics is particularly useful when examining governmentality during a time of crisis as 
ideas of home, homeliness and belonging are at its centre.38 If the traditional neo-liberal society 
can be “governed at a distance”39 because of its well-developed economic and mature societal 
structures, the eruption of a crisis indicates that these structures and systems are for some 
                                                     
27 T Lemke ‘Foucault, governmentality, and critique’ (2002) 14 Rethinking   Marxism:  A Journal of Economics, 
Culture and Society 49. 
28 T Lemke, ‘Varieties of materialism’ (2015) 10 BioSocieties 490. 
29 C Gordon, ‘Governmental rationality: an introduction’ in G Burchell, C Gordon & P Miller P The Foucault 
Effect: Studies in Governmentality. (University of Chicago Press, 1991) p. 5. 
30  M Foucault, Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984 Volume III, (2000, The New Press: New York) 
p. 68. 
31 ibid, p. 82. 
32 supra, note 28, p. 5. 
33 D Bigo, ‘Security and immigration: toward a critique of the governmentality of unease’ (2002) 27 
Alternatives 63. 
34 P O’Malley, ‘Governmentality and the risk society’ (1999) 28 Economy and Society 138. 
35 W Walters, ‘Secure Borders, Safe Haven, Domopolitics’ (2004) 8 Citizenship Studies 237. 
36 ibid. 
37 Supra note, 29. 
38 ibid & J Darling, ‘Domopolitics, governmentality and the regulation of asylum accommodation’ (2011) 30 
Political Geography 263. 
39 N Rose & P Miller, ‘Political power beyond the state: problematics of government’ (1992) 43 The British 
Journal of Sociology 173, p. 175. 
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reason no longer working effectively. Domopolitics mobilises feelings of affect and belonging 
to reassert the ideals and values of the home to return to the stability that was previously 
enjoyed.40 However, another rationality can be detected in domopolitics; the need to 
domesticate and tame any forces deemed threatening to the stable home.41 By identifying 
domopolitics, it is possible to draw attention to how the space granted through law can be 
squeezed and restricted by politics. Here, domopolitics illuminates how the EU’s holistic 
approach to the migrant crisis operates in spaces of the EU home, hotspots within the home 
and even beyond the territory of the EU. 
 
2. Domopolitics in migration policy 
 
Previous studies of the governance of migration have drawn attention to the tactics of ‘control’ 
and the use of another of Foucault’s ideas, disciplinary power.42 Other studies discuss the 
criminalisation of migration and the deployment of tactics of security. However, the EU’s 
response to the migration crisis, as articulated in the European Agenda on Migration and 
subsequent documents, emphasises a “rights-based” approach underpinned by the value of 
solidarity and a desire for further integration at the supranational level. Thus, I argue that a 
medicalisation of migration can be seen. This results in a governmentality that deploys tactics 
that operationalise prescribed outcomes, aim to limit the physical effects of migration on the 
EU territory and deploy government of the self to alter migration behaviours to this end. 
Through this, the migrant subject is (re)conceptualised as something to be treated rather than 
being recognised as an individual to be granted access to and the ability to claim their rights.  
This (re)conceptualisation co-opts the target of domopolitical governance to participate in its 
construction and they provide and volunteer the information and data used by its tactics. This 
style of governance hinges on what Foucault termed “technologies of the self”,43 and involves 
the ways in which human beings come to understand and act upon themselves in relation to 
certain regimes of authority and knowledge, often as a result of tactics to advance self-
improvement. The EU’s use of domopolitics invites individual migrants into a system that 
presents possibilities of achieving a certain position if they change their body, thoughts or 
conduct. For instance, if a migrant complies with detention, submits to probing questionnaires, 
gives over their fingerprints and DNA to a database, then at some point in the future they might 
gain access to the rights and freedoms of the EU and enjoy a better quality of life. However, 
this raises questions about the nature of the EU as an international human rights actor that has 
been recognised and awarded for its promotion of rights, and has human rights as a 
foundational principle. Another problem, is that the tactics of governmentality operated by the 
domopolitics exclude migrants from decision-making processes and avenues for recourse.  
 
In terms of the two case studies that follow, first domopolitics is used to deconstruct the 
processes of migrant screening and categorisation that occur when persons arrive into the EU. 
The analysis develops the domestication aspect of domopolitics to show how these procedures 
aim to render the migrant and migration as a knowable and treatable phenomenon so that an 
EU policy response can be readily deployed. I argue that this ensures the EU’s weak solidarity 
is not jeopardised and prescribed solutions can be relied upon to de-escalate the crisis. Second, 
the approach of resilience building amongst individual migrants and third-country partners is 
                                                     
40 supra, note 35. 
41 Ibid. 
42 M Duffield, ‘Racism, migration and development: the foundations of planetary order’ (2006) 6 Progress in 
Development Studies 68. 
43 L H Martin, H Gutman & P H Hutton, Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault’ (University 
of Massachusetts Press, 1988).  
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deconstructed to show the self-responsibilising tendencies of EU policy and how these operate 
to shift responsibility for resolving the crisis away from the EU and toward the migrant or third-
country, thus protecting the weak solidarity. The tools of governmentality here rely on the 
“government of the self”44 and see the targets of governance becoming complicit with the EU 
in bringing the crisis under control.  
 
 
III. The power of the health frame in migrant screening, categorisation and prescribed 
policy solutions 
 
The tools of health that can be detected within the EU’s domopolitics are the cultivation of 
experts, the screening and categorisation of migrants, and the development of prescribed 
solutions. The language and narrative of the holistic approach is central. The EU commands a 
web of expertise regarding migration giving credence to the view that crisis is prime for expert 
intervention as it provides impetus and urgency for their work.45 The holistic approach 
advocated by the EU crosses policy boundaries and brings together border policy, visa policies 
and initiatives, refugee law, anti-trafficking and smuggling measures, and irregular migration 
policies. Certain actors have seen their role be expanded and new competences conferred such 
as Frontex and the EASO as well as the development of new technological solutions to assist 
such as the EURODAC database, integrated border management systems and interoperability 
capabilities across policy areas including the Visa Information System, Schengen Information 
System and criminal justice systems. The article from Roberts in this issue speaks further to 
the surveillance that occurs through the use of algorithmic technologies and Dabrowska-
Klosinka’s contribution discusses issues with information exchange.  
 
This web of expertise, which is responsive and continually developing through systems of 
monitoring and analysis,46 decentralises migration policy and distances it from the accountable 
decision-making institutions. This is not to say there is no accountability over the actions of 
these actors, there are internal procedures, codes of conduct, good governance and best practice 
policies but these are less transparent and accessible to the individual. Prioritising this type of 
governance is expedient for the EU in maintaining its health through its policies as it helps 
ameliorate issues with consensus and solidarity in the traditional decision-making arenas 
whereby Member States may not agree on the nature of action to be taken. However, the 
concern is that it has the effect of closing off, and rendering invisible accountability and access 
to rights for individual migrants. These subjects of government become passive and are 
anticipated to accept the decisions of the expert are the best available option. The hospital 
environment gave rise to the medical gaze47 as the patient was positioned as subject for curing 
and learning, relying on the expertise of the trained to return them to health.48 
 
The screening and categorisation procedures used to identify migrants and determine how they 
should be processed as they arrive into the EU are utilise tools associated with maintaining 
health. The processes operate to reduce the migrant’s ability to control their personal narrative 
                                                     
44 M Foucault, Government of the Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France 1982-1983 (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010). 
45 P Redfield, Life in Crisis: The ethical journey of Doctors Without Borders (University of California Press, 
2013). 
46 European Commission, Migration Profiles (2019) < https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/migration-
demography/migration-profiles_en> accessed 27 August 2019. 
47 Penetrating, tangible observation by a clinician. M Foucault, The birth of the clinic: an archaeology of 
medical perception (tr. A M Sheridan) (Routledge, 2003) p. xiv. 
48 Simons J, Foucault & the Political (Routledge, 1995) p. 29. 
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and experience as computer information systems and algorithmic technology excludes them 
from the decision-making process. In terms of governance of the crisis, these screening 
techniques operate to reduce the threat of migration so that it is knowable and calculable and 
the EU home can be made resilient against it. These processes are central to the key purpose 
of the migration hotspots in Italy and Greece provided under the Agenda on European 
Migration, such as Lampedusa and Lesvos.49 Further, the scope for using fingerprints and other 
biometric data has been expanded. The Commission proposes exploring their use in the 
EURODAC system by developing smart technologies50 and using facial recognition software 
on digital photographs.51 Guidelines were issued in May 2015 to establish best practice when 
gathering fingerprints from migrants in order to improve consistency in the application of the 
legislative framework across Member States, who employed a range of approaches to gather 
this data including detention and coercion.52 
 
The collection of data is central to the EU gaining knowledge about the migrant, their activities, 
behaviours and habits. This knowledge is then utilised by the EU in its governmentality to 
bring the migration crisis under control, return stability in the EU home and protect itself from 
potential harm stemming from its lack of solidarity. The use of databases “creates relationships 
among pieces of information that do not exist in those relationships outside of the database”.53 
Thus, the rationality of collecting data centres less on physical sensory recognition and more 
on the stabilisation and ordering of identity.54 Digital stores of information, such as 
EURODAC, “sorts, organises and produces subjects”.55 On the basis of these subjects and the 
perceptions the data creates about them, the EU system of migration governance takes 
decisions about which channel of migration a person is allocated to.  
 
This process of (re)conceptualises the migrant away from their physical body and thus limits 
the autonomy that can be exercised over the identity produced by the system. The discourse of 
data is a characteristic of the “postmodern, postindustrial mode of information” but “leads to 
an uncomfortable discovery that the population participates in its own self construction as 
subjects” by providing the information to be entered.56 Further, there is no clear framework 
that guarantees the standards of screening and registration of migrants by the authorities so 
these tools are used in conjunction with use of expertise explained above. In cases where 
wrongful registration has occurred, it has been found to be due to lack of proper interpretation, 
arbitrary assessment, lack of presentation and the lack of qualified and trained personnel in 
issues of cultural and linguistic differences.57 Yet many instances are also probably not picked 
                                                     
49 DG Home Affairs, ‘Hotspot state of play’ 23 September 2016, <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-
we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/press-material/docs/state_of_play_-_hotspots_en.pdf> accessed 29 
August 2019. 
 
50 EURODAC, which stands for European Dactyloscopy, is the European fingerprint database for 
identifying asylum seekers and irregular border-crossers; European Commission, ‘A European agenda on 
migration’ (Communication) COM (2015) 240 final, p.13. 
51 ibid. 
52 ibid. 
53 M Poster, ‘Foucault and Databases: Participatory Surveillance’ in B Smart (ed) Michel Foucault 2 Critical 
Assessments (Taylor and Francis, 1995) 175, p. 197. 
54 B Simon, ‘The return of panopticism: supervision, subjection and the new surveillance’ (2005) 3 Surveillance 
and Society 1, p. 16. 
55 ibid. 
56 D Lyon, Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life (Open University Press, 2001), p. 115. 
57 Pro Asyl ‘Walls of shame: accounts from the inside: the detention centres of Evros’ April 2012 
<https://www.proasyl.de/wp-
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up or are dismissed due to lack of knowledge on complaints procedures and opportunities for 
redress. Such an approach to governance has synergy with the idea of epistemic injustice 
proposed by Flear in this issue. 
 
When considered cumulatively, use of such tools results in governance based on prescribed 
solutions. The narrative of the EU approach is constructed around gaining information and 
knowledge on patterns, behaviours and characteristics, much like the pathology of a disease.  
Understanding the EU’s governance as treatment-like becomes particularly serviceable as 
decisions are taken clinically and outcomes predetermined and ready to be applied. This 
approach operates to medicalise, rather than criminalise or demonise, the migrant subject so it 
becomes knowable and treatable. The Commission’s position is that, “A clear and well 
implemented framework for legal pathways to entrance in the EU (both through an efficient 
asylum and visa system) will reduce push factors towards irregular stay and entry, contributing 
to enhanced security of EU borders as well as the safety of migratory flows”.58 As detailed, 
this process involves tactics of governance that can be interpreted as contributing to the 
medicalisation of the migrant so that the crisis can be resolved in a way that causes minimal 
upset to the EU’s fragile solidarity. The border guards who process arrivals at hotspots are thus 
central to the practical operation of this governance and are trained in how to operate such an 
approach. 
 
The training guidance instructs that initial interviews with migrant arrivals should be carried 
out in full respect for fundamental rights; the communication should be as fluid as possible, 
open and non-threatening.59 The process of assigning the migrant to the correct channel 
requires border guards to have knowledge of the diversity of migratory movements such as 
countries of origin, beliefs and language.60 The guidance also encourages awareness of the 
possible reactions that people may display in interview scenarios.61 Thus, there is emphasis on 
what an individual implies by their appearance and demeanour in the interview; these 
insinuations are also to be gathered and documented in the records. Guards are encouraged to 
embellish the specific information provided explicitly by the interviewee with tactical and 
strategic information that could feed into the broader crisis management, such as information 
that could assist in countering the illegal activities of smugglers and traffickers.62 Information 
could be details on safe houses, meeting points or suppliers of forged documentation. Also 
encouraged, as strategic information, is deduced intelligence that points to the modus operandi 
of migrants, routes or push/pull factors at play.63 This information is used in analysis of specific 
countries and the construction of Migration Profiles that inform foreign and development 
policy.64 
 
                                                     
content/uploads/2015/12/PRO_ASYL_Report_Walls_of_Shame_Accounts_From_The_Inside_Detention_Cente
rs_of_Evros_April_2012-1.pdf 
58 European Commission, ‘A European Agenda on Migration’ (Communication) COM(2015) 240 final, p.6. 
59 Frontex, Fundamental rights training for border guards (Frontex Information & Transparency Team, 2013)  
<http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Training/Fundamental_Rights_Training_for_Border_Guardsl.pdf>
accessed 10 November 2016, p. 94. 
60 ibid. 
61 ibid. 
62 ibid. 
63 ibid. 
64 European Commission, Migration Profiles (2019) < https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/migration-
demography/migration-profiles_en> accessed 27 August 2019. 
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The Frontex Risk Analysis in 2016 admitted that it is not always possible to carry out thorough 
screening due to time constraints.65 The Agenda does introduce vulnerability screening to assist 
the prioritising of cases and admissibility interviews in order to make the system more 
efficient.66 However it remains to be seen whether additional resourcing will be able to resolve 
these issues and the expanded role for databases and algorithmic technologies will still 
dehumanise the decision-making that occurs on the basis of the interview data. By 
understanding the circumstances of information retrieval, it is possible to appreciate how a 
particular identity of the migrant is produced. The systems of digital surveillance establish a 
narrative that the EU has expert knowledge on migration traits and attributes that will enable 
migration policy to operate more efficiently and with better outcomes. The emphasis on having 
the maximum amount of knowledge possible on the migrant subject is important for the EU’s 
domopolitics as this information domesticates the threat posed to the EU home. Relying on 
technological solutions also minimises the need for greater solidarity among Member States as 
they are less personnel dependent to operationalise. The following section examines the idea 
that the migrant is complicit in the EU’s domopolitics by examining tactics of fostering 
resilience, shifting responsibility and promoting self-management to a responsibilised migrant 
subject.  
 
IV. The implications of health governance for the legitimacy of the EU’s role in the 
crisis of migration: tools of responsibilisation and complicit partners 
 
Both the establishment of migration hotspots and increased migrant screening procedures have 
resulted in a greater emphasis on experts in the EU’s approach to managing the migration crisis. 
The Agenda also attempts to relocate the governance of migration to what are termed as 
“partner countries”,67 “countries of origin and transit”,68 and “third countries”.69 The 
Commission advocates for a “more coordinated, systematic and structured approach” which 
matches the EU’s interests and those of its partners, in response to the crisis.70 Short term 
objectives centre on saving lives at sea and in countries of origin and transit, increasing return 
rate and enabling migrants to “stay close to home and to avoid taking dangerous journeys”.71 
The longer term objective is to reduce the root causes of irregular migration and force 
displacement by addressing deeper political, social and economic factors.72 A new Partnership 
Framework is envisaged as the way of meeting these objectives. This initiative includes 
developing greater capacity at the local level in the areas of border control, asylum, counter-
smuggling and reintegration.73 
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67 European Commission, ‘On establishing a new partnership framework with third countries under the 
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This preference can be seen as involving the reverting of obligations and responsibility away 
from the EU and onto these third-country partners. Central to governmentality are technologies 
for “governing at a distance” and the creation of “locales, entities and persons” able to operate 
a regulated autonomy.74 As high numbers of migrants continue to seek entry to the EU, the 
technologies for managing migration become increasing apparent.75 These tactics draw on 
previously establish instruments of foreign policy and development strategy which have 
become underpinned by the rationale that “migration is difficult to manage without a policy 
structure established to guide managers” to extend their remit.76 Thus, the Agenda proposes 
enriching existing bilateral and regional cooperation frameworks and stepping up the role of 
EU delegations in key countries to include a migration role.77  
 
In practice, the EU commits to helping third countries meet their obligations by offering 
support such as capacity building to manage returns and readmissions, information and 
awareness campaigns to educate individuals on the risks and realities of migration to the EU, 
and support for integration and community-building measures.78 The Commission set out a 
strategic vision on how EU external action can foster resilience and self-reliance for forcibly 
displaced persons as close as possible to their country of origin.79 The European Council 
summit in Valetta in November 2015 also emphasised that resilience was a useful tool to 
support “the most vulnerable”.80 Specifically, it was advocated that resilience can be found 
through rural development, food and nutrition security, health, education and social 
protection.81 These preferences indicate that the production of subjects capable of living with 
abstract uncertainty is a new framework for achieving security.82 Rendering a non-resilient 
community as vulnerable follows the valorisation of the resilient subject, the former requiring 
intervention of some kind.83 
 
Central to this governance are tools for the migrant to change their understanding of their 
experience and alter their conduct accordingly. Foucault called this “governance of the self” as 
individuals are permitted to effective operations on their own being in order to transform 
themselves so they can attain a certain state of privilege or stability.84 They imply certain modes 
                                                     
74 N Rose & P Miller, ‘Political power beyond the state: problematics of government’ (1992) 43 The British 
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of training and modification in terms of acquiring new skills and attitudes.85 Individuals then 
fulfil governmental objectives by conducting themselves responsibly.86 The legal channels of 
migration crystallised by the Agenda on European Migration in essence create a system that 
affects how individual migrants conduct themselves.87 Individual migrants are encouraged to 
adopt a certain form of practical relationship to themselves to advance the EU’s governance of 
migration and de-escalation of the crisis.88 However, the partnership alluded to in these policies 
comes with a price as individuals and third-countries must assume responsibility for the 
activities of migration, how they are carried out and the outcomes they produce.89 The 
responsibilisation operates so the migrant adopts the values of the EU home and appear less 
threatening to its privileged citizenry, while remaining outside its system. The emphasis on 
resilience within the Agenda stresses how the migrant and third-countries can achieve their 
own ‘home’ and the need for large-scale migration will be negated. 
 
The ideas of self-government and self-responsibilisation contribute to the medicalised reading 
of the EU’s domopolitics as it operates to palliate the lack of solidarity between Member States. 
By responsibilising the migrant subject and co-opting them into the domopolitics, the practical 
demonstration of solidarity by the EU becomes less of an imperative so its weakness is palliated 
and the EU system less affected by the crisis. The tactics of responsibilisation are based on 
government of the self which is a permanent state where “one must become the doctor of 
oneself”.90 The extent to which these tactics produce a resilient subject. According to 
Anderson’s view, such strategy operates on an assumption that the state has a duty to protect 
the population and the population can demand to be protected.91 Thus the ability of policy to 
foster a migrant to self-govern is less important and resilience becomes more of a tool for crisis 
management and the reduction of risk. If considered in relation to the palliative care of EU 
solidarity, resilient subjectivity understands that ‘subjects that are capable of securing 
themselves are less of a threat and in being so are not a threat to the governance capacities of 
their States nor to the governance of the global order either’.92 From this perspective, resilience 
becomes a negative value because it produces “politically debased” form of subjectivity that 
secures neoliberal governmentality.93 Thus, to return to Walters’ view that governmentality is 
encountered, it is important to assess what this governance preference indicates about the EU. 
 
Article 80 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) establishes solidarity and the fair sharing 
of responsibility between Member States as central values in the EU system, providing a legal 
basis for the implementation of these principles in EU policies on asylum, migration and border 
control.94 The European Parliament has articulated that solidarity can take both internal and 
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external forms.95 The tactics of the Agenda emphasise the EU’s ability to operate external 
solidarity through agencies and establishing relations with third-countries. The internal 
solidarity measures of relocation, mutual recognition, operational support and, generally, 
taking a proactive approach to migration policy are much more difficult to put into effect. This 
indicates dissonance amongst the EU’s institutions with regards the level of solidarity it should 
espouse.  
 
The Commission has struggled to implement policies in the AFSJ under the Tampere, Hague 
and Stockholm programmes across the 2000s, indicating that Member States do not see 
solidarity and cooperation on these matters from the same perspective. The European 
Parliament has called for creation solidarity in terms of upholding human rights so as not to 
undermine the EU’s credibility.96 The Commission proposes to reform the Reception 
Conditions Directive in order to increase the level of harmonisation of reception conditions 
and ensure dignified reception standards throughout the EU, reduce incentives for secondary 
movements and enhance migrant self-sufficiency by granting more favourable conditions for 
access to the labour market.97 It believes this reform will contribute to a better management of 
the asylum flows and the proper treatment of applicants across the EU. 98 When an applicant is 
not in the Member State where he/she is required to be, he/she will not be entitled to material 
reception conditions or employment and vocational training. However, applicants will always 
be entitled to health care and to a dignified standard of living, in accordance with fundamental 
rights. Children will always have access to educational activities pending the transfer to the 
Member State responsible.99 These proposals require a significant resource commitment from 
Member States and, even with the safeguards; it could be difficult to garner the levels of 
solidarity needed to implement them successfully. 
 
Considering the tactics in the Agenda that emphasise “government of the self”, it is unclear 
how these can be reconciled with solidarity. This raises issues for the EU’s identity as an 
international human rights actor: if the Agenda is successful in realising the self-
responsibilisation, and thus self-government, of migrants and third countries then the EU may 
lose its relevance in this area. In engaging in activities which operate a politics of exclusion in 
order to conceal its weak solidarity, it is perhaps making its position as a human rights actor 
obsolete. Therefore the implications of the EU’s governmentality extends beyond the difficulty 
faced by individuals and speaks of a fundamental deficiency in the its capacity as a human 
rights actor to conduct the conduct of its Member States, and even institutions, to deliver on 
commitments beyond the rhetoric and narrative of rights. Thus, the EU has become reliant on 
forms of governmentality that mediate this resource deficit but maintain its relevancy through 
language.  
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V. Conclusion 
 
This article has examined how the EU’s governance of the migrant crisis constitutes a 
domopolitical governmentality based on notions of health. It is argued that the EU’s 
domopolitics operates to resolve the crisis and return to stability while preventing negative 
repercussions for the polity due to its lack of solidarity. Rather than instigating measures that 
truly advance human rights and demonstrate solidarity with migrants and third-countries, the 
Agenda on European Migration focuses on preserving its internal health and employs tactics 
of governmentality to alter the conduct of migrants and third-country partners to this end.  
 
A number of tools that help deconstruct the EU’s narratives of a rights-based approach were 
detailed and two examples of this domopolitics in practice were provided: migrant screening 
and categorisation processes at the border and the use of responsibilisation and resilience-
building of migrants and third-countries to circumvent internal solutions. Thus the possibility 
to expand how we can understand the encounter between health and migration has been shown, 
demonstrating wider implications of this type of governance for the EU as an international 
human rights actor. The response to the migration crisis by the EU targets the preservation of 
its policy relevance and the examples provided here demonstrate the difficulty migrants face 
in accessing and claiming their rights in a system where the objective is the preservation of its 
own health. Subsequently, the object and target of future migration policy developments must 
be deconstructed so their practical manifestation can be considered against the EU’s central 
values. 
 
